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1 Clinical and Scientific Background 
The articles in this special issue explore a host of complex issues raised by the emergence of 
novel mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) to reduce the risk of transmitting 
mitochondrial disease to future persons.  
Mitochondrial diseases are among the most common neuromuscular diseases and serious 
mitochondrial diseases may cause suffering and premature death.1 Mitochondria are the 
intracellular structures that produce energy for cell functions and each mitochondrion has a 
maternally inherited genome (mtDNA) that is separate from the cell’s nuclear genome 
(nDNA). One way that mitochondrial diseases arise is when harmful mutations occur in 
mtDNA and this mutant mtDNA is present in harmful concentrations in the body. In such 
instances, mitochondria are unable to provide the energy that cells need in order 
adequately to perform bodily functions. Since the mitochondrial genome is maternally 
inherited, so too are mtDNA diseases. Some examples of mtDNA diseases include LHON 
(Leber hereditary optic neuropathy) and NARP (neurogenic muscle weakness, ataxia, 
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retinitis pigmentosa).2 As names such as ‘NARP’ suggest, mitochondrial diseases often 
present as a diverse collection of symptoms.  There are no known cures for mtDNA diseases. 
Women carrying harmful mtDNA mutations often face uncertainty surrounding whether or 
not their genetic children will inherit a serious mitochondrial disease. Much of this 
uncertainty depends on the type of mtDNA mutation an intending mother is carrying: a 
homoplasmic mutation or a heteroplasmic mutation. If harmful mutations are found in all of 
the mtDNA in the body this is known as homoplasmy. Women with serious homoplasmic 
mtDNA diseases will always create children who are homoplasmic disease carriers. In 
contrast, the presence of harmful mutations in some but not all mtDNA in the body is 
known as heteroplasmy and the transmission of heteroplasmic mtDNA diseases across 
generations is less predictable. As a consequence, there is often clinical uncertainty 
surrounding whether embryos carrying heteroplasmic mtDNA mutations will develop into 
persons with serious mitochondrial disease.3  Due to this predictive uncertainty, existing 
tests such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) are often unable to help intending 
mothers determine whether a serious mtDNA disease will manifest in any offspring they 
create.4 Therefore, intending mothers with mtDNA diseases have historically had two 
reproductive choices: either abstain from having genetic children (e.g. forgo having children, 
adopt a child, or use an egg donor with in vitro fertilisation (IVF)) or have a genetically 
related child with the risk5 that the child will have a serious mitochondrial disease. 
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The emergence of MRTs offers hope to intending mothers who want to have genetically 
related children free from serious mitochondrial disease. Two novel interventions have been 
developed to reduce the risk of mtDNA disease transmission: maternal spindle transfer 
(MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT). Maternal spindle transfer involves removing the nDNA 
from an intending mother’s egg with unhealthy mitochondria and inserting that nDNA into 
an enucleated6 donor egg with healthy mitochondria.7 The egg carrying the healthy 
mitochondria (and mtDNA) from the donor and the nDNA of the intending mother can then 
be fertilised to create a healthy embryo (see Figure 1: Maternal Spindle Transfer). 
[Insert Figure 1]8 
In contrast, PNT involves fertilising an intending mother’s egg (carrying unhealthy 
mitochondria) and a donor’s egg (carrying healthy mitochondria) to create two embryos. 
The nDNA from the embryo with healthy mitochondria is removed and discarded. Next, the 
nDNA from the intending mother’s embryo (with unhealthy mitochondria) is transferred 
into the enucleated embryo carrying healthy mitochondria. The result is an embryo carrying 
healthy mitochondria from the egg donor and the nDNA contributions from the intending 
mother and the genetic father (see Figure 2: Pronuclear Transfer). It is estimated that both 
MST and PNT could become available for clinical use in the near future.  
[Insert Figure 2]9 
2 Law, Regulation and Policy 
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Given the novelty of these techniques, the question of whether and, if so, how they should 
be legalised is a large and important one. For the United Kingdom (UK), the first country to 
legalise these techniques, this question arose in the context of its long-established statutory 
framework, originating in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, 
governing assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and embryo research. When the Act 
was amended in various ways in 2008, in the light of progress in research relating to MRTs a 
section allowed for the possibility of regulations subsequently being passed to permit the 
use of MRTs in treatment.10 After this, in 2012, the UK Government asked the statutory 
regulator, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), to seek public views on 
MRTs. Based on a 2013 Report of the evidence it collected, the HFEA recommended to the 
Government that it proceed with the envisaged regulations,11 in relation to which there was 
in turn a further process of public consultation.12 Finally, following Parliamentary debate, 
the regulations were subsequently passed in Spring 2015 and came into force that Autumn 
though, at the time of writing, MRTs have not yet entered clinical practice.13 
 
Before and during the Parliamentary debate, various ethical and legal issues were discussed. 
One of the most significant concerned the widespread international prohibition of germline 
genetic modification and the various international statements and conventions which 
restrict or prohibit these. In this light, how was the proposed UK legal move to be viewed? 
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Of particular note is the Council of Europe’s 1997 Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, a legally binding convention signed by most European states though not, as it 
happens, the UK.14 Article 13 states that ‘an intervention seeking to modify the human 
genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and 
only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants’. 
Various questions arise regarding how this should be interpreted. Although not a signatory, 
the UK Government sought to define MRTs in such a way that they are outside the category 
of ‘germline genetic modification’.15 This was done by taking the view that it is the nuclear 
genome that is really at stake in this concept since it is that genome, along with 
environmental factors, that is responsible for “shap[ing] our personal characteristics and 
traits”.16 For any signatory state wishing to legalise MRTs, the UK strategy of holding that 
MRTs do not involve germline genetic modification would be one way forward.  
 
In contrast to the approach of the UK Government, in early 2016 a US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) commissioned report of an ad hoc committee of the US Institute of 
Medicine (IOM)17 held that MRTs would be a form of ‘germline genetic modification’, at 
least if female offspring are born.18 It also rejected the notion that MRTs can be understood 
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as ‘treatment’, other than in relation to prospective parents,19 thus perhaps implicitly 
questioning those aspects of the UK policy and regulatory debate that cast MRTs as such in 
relation to future people.20 However, in line with the UK Government, the Report likewise 
emphasises the greater significance of the nuclear, as compared with the mitochondrial, 
genome as regards ‘physical and behavioral characteristics’.21 Overall, the Report 
recommends a cautiously permissive approach to the potential regulation of MRTs.22  
 
Questions regarding the purpose of MRTs, including whether or not they ‘treat’, as well as 
how they should be understood in relation to the concept of germline genetic modification, 
are likely to be prominent in future debates elsewhere, in addition to questions such as the 
status of the mitochondrial donor, and whether people created by MRTs should be able to 
establish the identity of the donor. Despite now having a system of open-identity donation 
for traditional gamete donation, the UK has rejected this for MRTs, essentially on the basis 
of the nature of the mitochondrial donor’s contribution, relating to the mitochondrial rather 
than the nuclear genome.23  
 
3 The Papers 
Turning now to the contents of this volume, the six papers selected are tremendously 
diverse and yet there are core concerns that many of the authors share.  These include: an 
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interest in effects on ‘identity’ and the many different senses of that term; the question 
alluded to earlier of what counts as therapy and whether it matters ethically whether MRTs 
are therapy (and, if so, what kind of therapy); and questions of language and 
communication, ranging from arcane classificatory and conceptual questions right through 
to more practical ones about media depictions of science. 
Françoise Baylis’s paper engages with questions which are fundamental not only to 
mitochondrial replacement but to the whole future of human reproduction. She challenges 
the frequently made claim that ethics ‘lags behind’ science.  Such claims are often flawed 
both empirically and conceptually: conceptually because the very idea that ethics and 
science should proceed along parallel tracks in a temporally aligned way is questionable; 
empirically because bioethicists do routinely produce work on future scientific possibilities 
(such as human reproductive cloning and ectogenesis).24 Her paper also tackles fundamental 
questions about what value we should attach to genetic relatedness, about whether having 
one’s own genetically related child is a need or merely a want, about how we should 
allocate inevitably limited human and financial resources, and whether expensive 
reproductive technologies (such as MRTs) are a defensible use of these. 
As noted already, the idea of ‘identity’ figures prominently and is explored, in three very 
different ways, by Matthew Liao, César Palacios-González, and Jackie Leach Scully. 
Liao is interested in whether MRTs merely alter the characteristics (‘qualitative identity’) of 
a determinate future child or whether they instead lead to the creation of a completely 
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different, ‘numerically distinct’, child.25 He argues that MRTs alter numerical identity and 
that this has ethical implications. If MRTs merely altered the characteristics of a determinate 
future person, then that individual could later claim they had been harmed or benefitted by 
the techniques. But this is not possible, Liao suggests, if MRTs affect numerical identity for, 
without MRT, the person making the claim would not have existed at all. 
 
This issue, along with the related one of whether MRT should be thought of as therapy or 
instead as selective reproduction, is also discussed by César Palacios-González, in a paper 
exploring what ‘bioconservatives’ – particularly those working within the theoretical 
framework of Jürgen Habermas – should think about MRT.  One necessary condition for the 
permissibility of prenatal genetic interventions posited by the Habermasian framework is 
that they should be therapeutic.  For this reason, Palacios-González suggests that 
Habermasians ought perhaps to view PNT and MST using preselected gametes more 
favourably than MST without preselected gametes. For whereas the former are arguably 
therapeutic, the latter looks more like an instance of selective reproduction because the 
numerical identity of the resultant person is altered.26 
 
Palacios-González’s main conclusion is that bio-conservatives should view MST using 
preselected gametes, but no other form of MRT (including PNT), as morally acceptable. For 
while PNT can also meet the therapy-criterion, it is inconsistent with Habermas’s beliefs 
about the value and use of human embryos; this however is not a problem for MST since it 
acts on gametes rather than embryos. This conclusion is interesting for it implies that even 
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‘bioconservatives’ need not advocate a blanket ban on MRT and that they should instead 
take a nuanced view in which (what he terms) ‘MSTpg’ (MST with preselected gametes) is 
the only permitted form.27 
 
Exploring a different sense of ‘identity’, Scully asks how MRTs might influence the sense of 
self of the person created and how narrative identity might be affected.  She avoids jumping 
to pessimistic conclusions, but does raise several potential challenges for MRT-children.  
One is that, as a new and unusual social group, they may simply lack a clear origin-narrative.  
Another is that their sense of self may be adversely affected by media coverage, such as 
‘three parent IVF’ discourse and the implication that MRTs produce ‘healthy but unnatural 
embryos’.28  As a practical response, Scully suggests systematic monitoring of how MRT-
children and their families are talked about and that efforts may need to be made to 
‘counter potentially hurtful, harmful or limiting identity stories with more nuanced ones 
based on accurate empirical knowledge’.29 On a more general level, she suggests that 
effects on narrative identity perhaps deserve more attention than they often get in 
bioethics and policy discussions. 
 
Like Scully, Cathy Herbrand is concerned with media representations. In her paper, she sets 
out to compare and contrast two different areas of discourse.  The first is the recent UK 
parliamentary and public debates about ‘legalisation’.  These, she argues, often presented 
MRTs as a ‘straightforward and unique solution’, with the families affected seen as ‘a 
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homogenous group … characterised by desperation’. 30 The second is an ongoing study of 
families affected by mitochondrial disease.  Herbrand suggests that there is a gap between 
media portrayals of MRTs ‘as a kind of “miracle solution”’ and the perspectives of these 
families.31 The families are more diverse than is sometimes assumed, with each one ‘facing 
specific issues in terms of quality of life’, and fewer families standing to benefit than the 
media and public discourse suggests. 32 
 
Finally, the issue of whether MRT is therapy – and, if so what kind - is tackled by Ainsley 
Newson and Anthony Wrigley.  One important question for them is how MRT relates to the 
standard distinction between somatic and germline gene therapy.  Exploring this issue raises 
not only the question of whether MRTs are ‘somatic’ or ‘germline’ but also the question of 
whether it should be thought of as ‘gene therapy’ at all.  Reasons for at least questioning 
this include the fact that MRT involves replacing whole extra-nuclear organelles as opposed 
to targeting individual genes and (as discussed earlier in relation to Liao and Palacios-
González) the fact that some types of MRT may be more like selection than therapy. 
 
In response to various challenges for the established classificatory framework, Newson and 
Wrigley propose a new category into which MRT should fall: a subclass of genetic 
modification which they term ‘conditionally inheritable genomic modification’ (CIGM). MRTs 
are ‘conditionally inheritable’, rather than being straightforwardly ‘germline’ or ‘somatic’ 
because of factors such as ‘matrilineal inheritance, bottleneck effects and unpredictability in 
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mitochondrial segregation’. 33  This novel classification of MRTs has some ethical 
implications: for example, if correct, it shows that their ‘automatic prohibition as germline 
therapies is not warranted’. 34  Newson and Wrigley rightly make clear however that many 
of the ethical and policy issues here don’t depend (or don’t depend wholly) on classification.  
And so dealing with these classificatory issues, whilst helpful and valuable in many ways, will 
not settle all of our ethical questions. 
 
MRTs raise an extraordinarily wide range of ethical issues, many of which have application 
much more broadly across the fields of genetics and human reproduction. Hence we do not 
claim that these papers cover the entire set of issues raised, nor that they are 
representative, and clearly there is plenty of scope for further work on this topic: ranging 
from practical policy questions about mitochondrial donor anonymity and public funding of 
MRTs, through to conceptual issues about identity and the distinction between gene 
therapy and selective reproduction. Nonetheless, we do feel that these six papers take us 
forward in substantial and interesting ways and would like to thank our authors for their 
contributions, as well as everyone else involved in the process: including the many people 
who agreed to act as referees for this special issue and everyone who attended our 
symposium on the Ethics of Mitochondrial Replacement at King’s College London in 
September 2015. 
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